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What’s already known about this topic?  
• Distraction reduces pain but pain catastrophizing interferes with this effect 
• Mindfulness-based interventions are beneficial for the treatment of chronic pain but it is 
unclear if mindfulness can be induced to deal with acute pain 
• Mindfulness is believed to counteract catastrophic thinking about pain 
What does this study add? 
• A direct comparison of distraction and mindfulness inductions during experimental pain 
• Overall pain perception is not different under conditions of distraction and mindfulness 
• Mindfulness works better than distraction when pain catastrophizing is high, whereas the 
opposite is true when pain catastrophizing is low 
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Abstract 
Background 
The aim of this study was to investigate whether the perception of experimental pain was 
different during a mindfulness manipulation than during a distraction manipulation. 
Furthermore it was examined if effects were moderated by dispositional pain catastrophizing.  
Methods 
Undergraduate students (N = 51) completed self-report measures of pain catastrophizing and 
mindfulness. Subsequently they were administered a series of mildly painful heat stimuli, 
which they had to rate. During pain induction, participants listened to either a pre-recorded 
mindfulness instruction (mindfulness group) or a pre-recorded story (distraction group).  
Results 
After controlling for baseline experimental pain ratings, we found no overall group effect, 
indicating that there was no difference in experienced pain between the mindfulness group 
and the distraction group.  However, a significant moderation effect was found. When 
dispositional pain catastrophizing was high, pain was less pronounced in the mindfulness 
group than in the distraction group, whereas the opposite effect was found when the level of 
pain catastrophizing was low.  
Conclusions 
The findings suggest that in persons with a high level of catastrophic thinking about pain, 
mindfulness-based coping may be a better approach than distraction.  
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Introduction 
A common way to control pain is distraction. The underlying assumption is that when 
attention is engaged into the external environment, less resources are left for the processing of 
pain (McCaul and Malott, 1984; Villemure and Bushnell, 2002). The effects of distraction 
have mainly been investigated in laboratory studies using experimental pain. Often these 
studies have demonstrated beneficial effects of distraction on pain perception, assessed by 
self-report as well as neurophysiological measures (Petrovic et al., 2000; Tracey et al., 2002; 
Wiech et al., 2005; Van Damme et al., 2008; Van Ryckeghem et al., 2013).  
However, distraction may not always be effective.	  A threatening appraisal of pain is 
believed to make it difficult to ignore pain or direct attention away from it (Eccleston and 
Crombez, 1999; Van Damme et al., 2010). Such threatening appraisal is typically found in 
persons with high levels of pain catastrophizing, defined as an exaggerated negative mental 
set brought to bear during actual or anticipated painful experience, including cognitions 
related to excessive threat appraisal, rumination, and helplessness (Sullivan et al., 2001). It 
has been shown that persons characterized by high pain catastrophizing have difficulty 
disengaging attention from pain and to focus on tasks during pain (Crombez et al., 1998; Van 
Damme et al., 2004).  
An apparently opposing strategy is mindfulness, which involves paying attention to 
one's pain in an accepting and nonjudgmental way. Mindfulness has been defined as an 
openhearted, moment-to-moment, non-judgmental awareness, or being aware of the present 
moment with an attitude of curiosity, openness and acceptance (Kabat-Zinn et al., 1986; 
Davis and Hayes, 2011). Mindfulness is believed to counteract worrying and catastrophic 
thinking about pain (Schütze et al., 2010; Zeidan et al., 2012). Although mindfulness-based 
interventions have shown promising for the treatment of chronic pain (Chiesa and Serretti, 
2011; Veehof et al., 2011), it is less clear if brief inductions of mindfulness may help coping 
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with an acute pain stimulus. A number of studies investigated the effects of brief mindfulness 
interventions on experimental pain perception. It was shown that healthy persons who had 
received brief mindfulness training showed decreased experimental pain sensitivity (Zeidan et 
al., 2010; Liu et al., 2013). Interestingly, this mindfulness group showed lower pain 
sensitivity when using the acquired mindfulness skills than when they were distracted, 
although this was only the case when affective rather than sensory aspects of pain were 
considered, and when pain was of low intensity.  
The aim of the present study was to compare experimental pain perception during 
conditions of distraction and mindfulness. Furthermore, it was investigated if the difference 
between the conditions was moderated by dispositional pain catastrophizing. Healthy 
volunteers, while undergoing painful heat stimuli, were either distracted or were receiving 
mindfulness instructions. After the pain induction, participants rated sensory, affective, and 
cognitive aspects of the experienced pain. We hypothesized that experimental pain would be 
less pronounced in the mindfulness group than in the distraction group, and that this would be 
particularly the case in high pain catastrophizers.  
 
Method 
Participants  
Fifty-one undergraduate students (43 females and 8 men; mean age = 20.10, SD = 
2.27) participated in the experiment, which took between 45 and 60 minutes. They were 
compensated for their participation with either course credits or an incentive of €8. The study 
was approved by the local ethical committee and was performed according to the ethical 
standards laid down in the declaration of Helsinki. The participants were informed about the 
experimental procedure and their right to withdraw from the experiment at any time without 
consequences, and signed an informed consent. Participants were excluded from statistical 
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analysis when they reported current pain of at least moderate intensity (> 4/10; N = 1). 
Participants were also excluded when they reported to practice some form of meditation at 
least weekly (N = 4), as this could interfere with the experimental manipulation. Analyses 
were conducted on a final sample of 46 participants. 
Pain induction 
Experimental pain was induced by heat stimuli generated by a Somedic Thermotest™ 
(Stockholm, Sweden) with a 2.5 cm×5.0 cm thermode. Each stimulus had a duration of 4 
seconds, with a 32°C baseline temperature, a 46°C peak temperature, and a 7°C/s temperature 
change rate. These parameters were selected based upon piloting, with the aim to induce a 
mild pain experience that would allow participants to use the attention manipulations and 
instructions presented. Note that very intense pain is highly interruptive, which would 
possibly interfere with these attention manipulations and instructions (Eccleston and 
Crombez, 1999). Prior to the start of the experiment, participants were familiarized with the 
heat pain by presenting 3 stimuli on the left lower arm (just above the wrist). During the 
experiment heat pain stimuli were administered 7 times on the right lower arm (above the 
wrist as well). 
Experimental manipulation  
In the mindfulness group, pre-recorded instructions were provided through 
headphones	  during the experimental pain induction. The instructions (see appendix 1) were 
designed by one of the authors (BP), who is an experienced mindfulness meditation trainer. 
Mindfulness was previously defined as an openhearted, moment-to-moment, non-judgmental 
awareness. In order to establish this, our instructions were designed to cultivate 4 highly 
interrelated processes, specified within the third wave of behavioral and cognitive therapies in 
the so-called “hexaflex” (Fletcher and Hayes, 2005): contact with the present moment, 
acceptance, defusion and self as context. The participants were invited to look at the painful 
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sensation (contact with the present moment) with an open mindset (acceptance). By labeling 
the process (‘this is painful’), defusion was promoted, and when there were no stimuli the 
participant could ‘rest’ in awareness (self as context). To start, the participants were asked to 
direct their attention to the breathing and bodily sensations and were reminded that they could 
always come back to these sensations when drifted away, while trying to incorporate a gentle 
and mild attitude towards their experience. Furthermore, it was emphasized that participants 
did not have to reach any particular goal and that they didn’t have to change anything during 
the exercise. Below, we discuss more in detail the course of the exercise. 
In the first part of the mindfulness induction participants were asked to embody an 
investigating, open attitude by curiously paying attention to whatever is there at the present 
moment (thoughts, feelings, physical sensations or even sounds), by mentally labeling them as 
such when the experience was there. The attention was first directed to a stable object present 
in every moment: the breath. Participants were instructed to pay attention to the flow of breath 
and to be aware of the sensations of the body while breathing. It was proposed to label the 
sensations of the breath and the body sensations that were there in the present moment (e.g., 
‘warmth’, ‘cold’, ‘tension’), a common practice in the mindfulness training (Davis and Hayes, 
2011). 
During the second part participants were instructed that they simple could be open for 
whatever what was coming up while looking at the body sensations with an interested, 
investigating and friendly attention. This is achieved by paying attention to what is there in 
the present moment with an open and inviting attitude. Also it was asked to explore and label 
the emotions that are accompanied by these bodily sensations. Later on, sensory pain 
adjectives of the Dutch translation of the MPQ-DV (Vanderiet et al., 1987) were incorporated 
in the mindfulness-induction so that the instructions were able to match the sensations one 
may typically experience during the thermal stimulation. To guarantee an optimal guidance 
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the mindfulness-instructions were also synchronized with presentation of the pain stimuli. 
When a pain trial was administered participants were instructed, for example, to label these 
sensations as ‘heat” or “stinging”. Full instructions and timing of pain stimuli can be found in 
the appendix.  
In the distraction group, no instructions about how to cope with the pain were 
provided, and instead participants listened to 2 fairytales during the pain induction phase. 
These stories (available upon request) were pre-recorded by the same voice as the 
mindfulness instructions, and presented through headphones.   
Self-report measures 
A general questionnaire was used to collect demographic information and past and 
current pain experience. Pain items were based on the McGill Pain Questionnaire for the 
Dutch language (MPQ-DV, (Vanderiet et al., 1987). Specifically, participants were asked to 
indicate whether or not they had experienced pain during the past six months, and if so, to rate 
on 11-point numerical rating scales what was the average intensity of this pain, to what extent 
it interfered with their daily activities, and how intense the pain was at this moment. 
Participants were also asked about their experience with meditation (‘Do you weekly practice 
one of the following: meditation, yoga, tai-chi, qi-gong, breathing exercises or other related 
activities?’).  
Dispositional pain catastrophizing was assessed using the Dutch version of the Pain 
Catastrophizing Scale (Sullivan et al., 1995; Van Damme et al., 2000). This 13-item scale is 
suitable to assess pain catastrophizing in both clinical and healthy populations. Participants 
were asked to reflect on past painful experiences and to indicate the degree to which they 
experienced each of the 13 thoughts or feelings during pain (e.g. ‘I become afraid that the 
pain may get worse’) on a five-point scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (all the time). The Dutch 
version of the PCS has been shown to be valid and reliable, and the Cronbach’s alpha 
	   8	  
obtained in the present study (0.87) corresponds with earlier research for non-clinical 
populations (Van Damme et al., 2002).  
Dispositional mindfulness was assessed using 2 questionnaires, each emphasizing a 
core characteristic of mindfulness. The first one was the Mindful Attention and Awareness 
Scale (Brown and Ryan, 2003). This 15-item questionnaire assesses open or receptive 
awareness of and attention to what is taking place in the present (e.g. ‘I could be experiencing 
some emotion and not be conscious of it until sometime later.’). Scores range from 1 (almost 
always) to 6 (almost never), and higher scores are indicative of higher levels of mindfulness. 
The scale shows strong psychometric properties (Brown and Ryan, 2003), and has been 
validated in samples of cancer patients (Carlson and Brown, 2005) and chronic pain patients 
(McCracken et al., 2007). The internal consistency in the present study was good (Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.87). The second questionnaire, the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II  (Bond 
et al., 2011) is an instrument designed to assess individual differences in psychological 
flexibility, as conceptualized within Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT). It consists 
of 10 items, rated on a scale of 1 (‘never true’) to 7 (‘always true’), concerning negative 
evaluations of feelings (e.g., “anxiety is bad”), avoidance of thoughts and feelings (e.g., “I try 
to suppress thoughts and feelings that I don’t like by just not thinking about them”), 
distinguishing a thought from its referent (e.g., “when I evaluate something negatively, I 
usually recognize that this is just a reaction, not an objective fact”), and behavioral adjustment 
in the presence of difficult thoughts or feelings (e.g., “I am able to take action on a problem 
even if I am uncertain what is the right thing to do.”). A higher score is indicative of higher 
acceptance and less experiential avoidance (Bond et al., 2011). The scale shows strong 
psychometric properties (Jacobs et al., 2008), and the internal consistency in the present was 
good (Cronbach’s alpha of 0.89).  
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In order to estimate pre-experimental pain sensitivity, participants were asked to rate 
the stimuli used to familiarize them with the heat pain before the actual experiment, on 4 
items with 11-point numerical rating scales: (un)pleasantness (“How unpleasant did you find 
the heat stimulus?”; -5=very unpleasant; +5=very pleasant), intensity (“How intense did you 
find the heat stimulus?”; 0=not at all; 10=very), pain (“How painful did you find the heat 
stimulus?”; 0=not at all; 10=very), and fear (“How fearful are you for the heat stimulus?”; 
0=not at all; 10=very).  
In order to compare the pain experience between the 2 groups, the participants 
completed a 20-item pain questionnaire with 11-point rating scales, specifically developed in 
our lab for assessment of experimental pain (Goubert et al., 2004; Van Damme et al., 2008). 
The questionnaire consists of 4 subscales: sensory pain (2 items, e.g. ‘How much pain did you 
maximally experience during the thermal stimulation of your arm?’), affective pain (10 items, 
e.g., ‘I wondered whether this could be detrimental for my arm’), attention to the pain (3 
items, e.g. ‘I could not think about anything but the pain’), and general anxiety (5 items, e.g., 
‘I felt nervous’’). Items were rated on an eleven-point scale where 0 indicated ‘not at all’ and 
10 indicated ‘very much’, except for the sensory pain subscale (0 = no pain; 10 = worst 
imaginable pain). The subscales have been shown to be reliable in previous studies (Goubert 
et al., 2004; Van Damme et al., 2008). In the present study reliability was good for sensory 
pain (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.91), affective pain (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.87), and general anxiety 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.85), but not for the attention subscale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.47). The 
latter subscale was therefore not included in further analyses. 
Procedure 
In a first phase, participants completed the general questionnaire, PCS, MAAS, and 
AAQ-II. The experimental procedure was explained, and three pain stimuli were administered 
on the left arm, which participants were asked to rate. Next, a short relaxation exercise 
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(breathing focus – concentration meditation) was administered before the start of the proper 
experiment to all participants. The instruction was: “When you notice that your mind has 
wandered, gently bring it back to the sensations of the breath”. Concentration meditation 
produces a feeling of calmness. We induced this relaxation baseline in both the distraction and 
mindfulness group, to make sure that potential effects of the mindfulness induction were not 
simply due to the relaxation component of mindfulness, and thus to create a highly sensitive 
measurement of mindfulness effects (for a discussion about the differentiation between 
mindfulness and relaxation, see Siegel (Siegel et al., 2009) and Stanley (Stanley, 2012)).  
Then, participants were randomly assigned to the mindfulness group or the distraction 
group. During the experimental phase, participants received 7 pain stimuli on the right arm 
over a period of 10 minutes. We preferred not to work with one continuous pain stimulus, but 
rather with repeated, short, pain inductions to which corresponding mindfulness-based 
instructions could be presented. The heat stimuli were not administered according to a random 
schedule, but they were programmed so that they would optimally match the instructions of 
the mindfulness induction.	  	  After the completion of the experimental phase, participants rated 
their pain experience during pain induction using a 20-item questionnaire.  
Data-analysis 
 First, descriptive statistics were performed on the baseline self-report measures and 
questionnaire scores, and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to identify possible pre-
existing differences between the groups. Next, Pearson correlations between all 
questionnaires and baseline experimental pain ratings were computed. In order to test the 
primary hypothesis, a multivariate general linear model was performed with the post-
experimental self-reports (sensory pain, affective pain, and general anxiety) as dependent 
variables and Group (mindfulness versus distraction) as a between-subjects factor. In order to 
control for baseline experimental pain sensitivity, baseline ratings of unpleasantness, 
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intensity, pain, and fear were included as covariates. To test the secondary hypothesis, a 
multivariate general linear model was performed with the post-experimental self-reports 
(sensory pain, affective pain, and general anxiety) as dependent variables, Group 
(mindfulness versus distraction) as between-subjects factor, and PCS and PCS x Group as 
additional predictors.  
 
Results 
Descriptive statistics 
The participants overall reported having good or outstanding health (95.8%). Most of 
the participants (75%) had experienced some form of pain during the past six months (mainly 
abdominal/menstrual pain, headaches, pain as a result of injury, inflammation pain, muscle 
soreness). Most of the time the pain was not severe (M = 3.39, SD = 2.38) and did not 
interfere with their daily activities (M = 1.90, SD = 2.02). At the time of the experiment 
current pain intensity was low (M = 1.00, SD = 1.55). However, one participant reported pain 
of at least moderate intensity (6/10) and was excluded from further analyses. Four participants 
reported to weekly perform some form of meditation exercises. These participants were also 
excluded from further analyses. 
There were no significant baseline differences between groups on the questionnaire 
scores and on the ratings of the pain stimuli before the experimental manipulation (all Fs < 1). 
Table 1 summarizes all means, standard deviations, and statistics. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
Correlation analyses 
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 Pearson correlations between all questionnaires and baseline experimental pain ratings 
are presented in Table 2. The 2 mindfulness questionnaires (MAAS, AAQ) were significantly 
interrelated, and showed significant negative associations with dispositional pain 
catastrophizing (PCS). The 4 baseline pain sensitivity ratings were strongly interrelated. 
Higher PCS scores were associated with higher baseline experimental pain sensitivity 
(although the correlation with unpleasantness was not significant). Correlations between 
dispositional mindfulness questionnaires and baseline experimental pain sensitivity showed 
no significant associations, although there was an overall tendency that higher AAQ-II scores 
were associated with lower baseline pain sensitivity. The MAAS did not show any 
meaningful correlation with baseline experimental pain sensitivity ratings. Higher 
dispositional mindfulness was associated with lower dispositional pain catastrophizing, 
although the correlation with the MAAS was not significant. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
Comparison of mindfulness and distraction group 
A multivariate general linear model was performed with the post-experimental self-
reports (sensory pain, affective pain, and general anxiety) as dependent variables and Group 
(mindfulness versus distraction) as between-subjects factor. In order to control for baseline 
experimental pain, this variable was included as a covariate. No significant multivariate main 
effect of Group was found (F(3,38) = 0.75, p > .10). Significant multivariate main effects of 
baseline pain (F(3,38) = 4.93, p < .01) and baseline fear (F(3,38) = 8.44, p < .001) were 
found, indicating that baseline pain and fear were strong predictors of post-experimental 
ratings. The univariate effects of baseline pain were only significant for sensory pain (F(1,40) 
= 13.83, p < .01), and not for affective pain (F(1,40) = 0.62, p > .10) and anxiety (F(1,40) = 
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0.84, p > .10). The univariate effects of baseline fear were significant for affective pain 
(F(1,40) = 15.29, p < .001) and anxiety (F(1,40) = 13.39, p < .01), but not for sensory pain 
(F(1,40) = 0.13, p > .10). Note that these effects remained the same when including only 
female participants.  
Moderating role of dispositional pain catastrophizing 
A multivariate general linear model was performed with the post-experimental self-
reports (sensory pain, affective pain, and general anxiety) as dependent variables, Group 
(mindfulness versus distraction) as between-subjects factor, and PCS and PCS x Group as 
additional predictors. The multivariate main effect of PCS was not significant (F(3,40) = 2.01, 
p > .10). A significant multivariate main effect of Group (F(3,40) = 3.20, p < .05) was found, 
but this was qualified by a significant multivariate Group x PCS interaction effect (F(3,40) = 
3.02, p < .05). Follow-up univariate analyses showed that this interaction was significant for 
affective pain (F(1,42) = 9.05, p < .01), but not for sensory pain (F(1,42) = 2.59, p > .10) and 
general anxiety (F(1,42) = 1.30, p > .10). Note that these effects remained the same when 
including only female participants.  
To further disentangle the significant Group x PCS interaction on affective pain, we 
followed the guidelines by Holmbeck (2002) for post-hoc probing of moderation effects 
without having to create subgroups. In short, the following steps were followed: (1) We 
computed new conditional moderator values for PCS (i.e., PCS Low = 1SD below mean; PCS 
High = 1 SD above mean). (2) Then we computed new interactions terms: one interaction 
term to generate the slope for low PCS (PCS Low x Group) and one interaction term to 
generate the slope for high PCS (PCS High x Group). (3) Next we conducted new regressions 
to generate the slope for low PCS and high PCS. For each regression, the new conditional 
PCS value and group were entered as a first step in the regression, and the new interaction 
term (PCS conditional x group) was entered in the second step. The standardized beta 
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coefficient of group in these regressions indicates the direction of the effect and whether the 
effect is significant or not. (4) Finally, in order to present the slopes in a figure, values can be 
calculated for high versus low PCS levels in both the mindfulness and distraction groups. 
These are calculated by the following formula: intercept + unstandardized beta of group (for 
mindfulness group), and intercept – unstandardized beta of group (for distraction group). This 
was done separately for the high PCS and low PCS slopes, resulting in the 4 values depicted 
in Figure 1. The regressions indicated that for low levels of dispositional catastrophizing, the 
effect of Group was significant (β = 0.49, p = .013), with lower affective pain scores in the 
distraction group than in the mindfulness group. For high levels of dispositional 
catastrophizing, the reverse pattern was found, with higher affective pain scores in the 
distraction group than in the mindfulness group (β = -0.38, p = .075). 
 
INSERT FIG 1 
 
Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to investigate whether experimental pain would be 
experienced differently during a mindfulness induction than during a distraction induction, 
and if this would be moderated by dispositional pain catastrophizing. The main findings of the 
study are as follows. There was no overall difference in experimental pain experience 
between the mindfulness group and the distraction group. The effect of Group (mindfulness 
versus distraction) on affective pain experience was moderated by dispositional pain 
catastrophizing. More specifically, the mindfulness induction resulted in lower affective pain 
than the distraction induction when the level of dispositional pain catastrophizing was high, 
whereas the opposite effect was found for low levels of pain catastrophizing. 
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These findings deserve further discussion. The lack of an overall group difference is 
not in line with a study by Zeidan et al. (2010), who found that a 3-days mindfulness training 
reduced sensitivity for experimental pain more than a distraction task. Another study by Liu et 
al. (2013) showed a more complex pattern of results, with more reductions in distress during 
experimental pain as a result of a short mindfulness intervention compared to a distraction 
intervention, but with similar effects of both interventions on pain tolerance. However, note 
that in both of these studies, mindfulness training was much more extensive than in the 
present study, and that mindfulness skills were learned before confrontation with pain, 
whereas in our study mindfulness instructions were provided during pain administration. A 
more powerful mindfulness intervention may be needed to obtain an overall benefit of 
mindfulness over distraction. This is also in line with the conclusion of Sharpe et al. (2013), 
who found that a single brief mindfulness session was not sufficient to alter experimental pain 
perception in comparison with relaxation. 
The pattern of results in our study suggests that distraction and mindfulness may have 
differential effectiveness depending upon the level of pain catastrophizing. In high 
catastrophizers the mindfulness group had lower pain ratings than the control group, while in 
low catastrophizers the reverse was true. This is in line with theoretical and empirical work 
suggesting that distraction may not be effective in persons with a high tendency to 
catastrophize about pain (Heyneman et al., 1990; Goubert et al., 2004; Van Damme et al., 
2010; Verhoeven et al., 2010). In contrast, mindfulness-based interventions or techniques may 
be especially helpful in these high catastrophizing persons, by blocking the automatic 
negative appraisals usually evoked by pain. Those who do not catastrophize may rather 
benefit from distraction techniques. It must be noted here that the Group by PCS interaction 
effect was only significant for affective pain, and, although in the same direction, just failed to 
reach significance for sensory pain. The observation that the effects are more pronounced for 
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affective pain than for sensory pain is not surprising, as mindfulness is not primarily aimed at 
symptom reduction, but rather at altering individuals’ relationship with their symptoms 
(Chiesa and Serretti, 2011).   
The results from the present study are in line with the idea that mindfulness may affect 
pain experience by counteracting catastrophic thinking about pain. This idea stems from 
previous work in patients with chronic pain, which has shown significant negative 
correlations between measures of dispositional mindfulness and pain catastrophizing (Schütze 
et al., 2010; Cassidy et al., 2012), as well as reductions in pain catastrophizing after 
mindfulness-based pain management programs (Gardner-Nix et al., 2008; Cusens et al., 
2009). Mindfulness may counteract catastrophic thinking in several ways. Firstly, mindfulness 
promotes paying attention on purpose to what is happening in the present moment. As such it 
can reduce the future-oriented, ruminative style of thinking that is often automatically invoked 
in those persons with a high level of catastrophic thoughts about pain (Sullivan et al., 2001; 
Schütze et al., 2010). Secondly, by inducing an open, accepting, attitude towards emerging 
thoughts and feelings, mindfulness may reduce the constant struggle to control or suppress 
pain, which is often seen in high pain catastrophizers, and which has been shown to have 
counter-productive effects on pain experience (McCracken and Eccleston, 2003; Masedo and 
Esteve, 2007; Chiesa and Serretti, 2011). Thirdly, the labeling of the pain experience may 
create a distance between the experience and the observer, a process that is called diffusion 
(McHugh, 2011). As such, individuals may learn so see their catastrophic thoughts for what 
they are, and not as reliable reflections of reality determining what to do next (Davis and 
Hayes, 2011). This is also in line with studies showing that in high catastrophizing persons, 
sensory monitoring, i.e., focusing on and reporting the sensory characteristics of the pain, is 
more fruitful than distraction because it dissociates the sensation from the negative emotions 
(Roelofs et al., 2004). It is not yet clear which of these components have the strongest impact, 
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so it would be interesting to conduct more systematical research to disentangle the role of 
each of these possible mechanisms. 
The findings of this study may have implications for interventions in the context of 
acute pain or aversive physical sensations in the context of medical procedures. Although 
distraction of attention is often the default coping strategy used in such situations, our results 
suggest that this may not be the most adaptive strategy for everyone, as already suggested by 
other studies (Roelofs et al., 2004; Van Damme et al., 2004; Verhoeven et al., 2010). More 
specifically, persons characterized by a tendency to experience catastrophic thoughts when 
confronted with pain or adversity may benefit less from distraction during aversive or painful 
medical procedures. In these persons, mindfulness-based guidance techniques, in which an 
openhearted, moment-to-moment, non-judgmental awareness is promoted, may be more 
helpful, as this could counteract the automatic negative appraisals usually evoked by pain. Of 
course, it should be kept in mind that replication of these findings using “real” aversive 
medical procedures is necessary before drawing firm conclusions. 
A number of issues concerning this study require further consideration. First, power 
analyses showed that we would need at least 98 participants to detect the tested effects with a 
medium effect size and with a power of 50%. This is a limitation of our study, and replication 
with larger sample sizes is required. Likewise, the differentiation between low and high levels 
of pain catastrophizing was relative and specific for this sample. Replication of the findings in 
a study with pre-selected high versus low PCS scorers according to normative data is 
recommended. Second the present study was conducted using mild experimental pain stimuli 
and a very brief mindfulness and distraction induction in (mainly female) undergraduate 
students. The results should therefore not be readily generalized to other healthy populations 
or to populations with clinical or more severe procedural pain. Also, generalization to more 
extensive mindfulness-based stress reduction programs may not be justified. Third, we have 
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no information whether the participants in the mindfulness group actually followed the 
instructions, and about the extent to which participants in the distraction group were 
effectively distracted by the pre-recorded fairytale. This lack of a manipulation check is 
clearly a limitation of our study. Fourth, the instructions in the mindfulness group were 
specifically timed in relation to painful stimuli, while the pre-recorded story presented in the 
distraction group was rather continuous. Future studies should consider matching these 
conditions better. Fifth, the questionnaire used to assess baseline pain sensitivity was not the 
same as the questionnaire used to compare pain perception between the mindfulness and the 
distraction conditions. It may be recommended that future studies use the same questionnaire 
for both pre- and post-testing of pain experience. Furthermore, because the lack of a 
“spontaneous coping” group, it could not be shown to what extent the mindfulness and 
distraction inductions actually reduced pain perception. 
In sum, the findings of our study indicate that the level of pain catastrophizing should 
be considered when using techniques to cope with acute or procedural pain. While distraction 
may be helpful particularly in low pain catastrophizers, mindfulness techniques may be 
preferable in high catastrophizing persons.  
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Table legends 
 
Table 1. Mean questionnaire scores and experimental pain ratings before the experimental 
manipulation. Values between brackets are standard deviations. 
 
Table 2. Pearson correlations between dispositional mindfulness and pain catastrophizing, and 
baseline experimental pain in the total sample 
 
 
Figure legends 
 
Fig. 1. Regression slopes for the moderating role of dispositional pain catstrophizing in the 
effect of Group (distraction versus mindfulness) on affective pain, based on an estimation of 
low versus high scores on PCS (mean -/+ 1 standard deviation).  
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Table 1. Mean questionnaire scores and baseline experimental pain ratings before the 
experimental manipulation. Values between brackets are standard deviations. 
 
 Mindfulness group Control group F(1,49) 
MAAS 58.15 (9.51) 57.56 (9.38) 0.05 
AAQ-II 48.69 (10.28) 48.16 (10.70) 0.03 
PCS 20.73 (10.06) 18.76 (8.38) 0.58 
Intensity 
Unpleasantness 
6.12 (2.10) 
-1.04 (2.25) 
5.76 (2.24) 
-1.44 (1.26) 
0.34 
0.61 
Painfulness 3.46 (2.61) 3.24 (2.47) 0.10 
Fear 3.00 (2.56) 3.20 (2.78) 0.07 
Note: MAAS = Mindful Attention and Awareness Scale; AAQ-II = Acceptance and Action 
Questionnaire-II; PCS = Pain Catastrophizing Scale 
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Table 2. Pearson correlations between dispositional mindfulness and pain catastrophizing, and 
baseline experimental pain in the total sample 
 
 Mean (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. MAAS 58.72 (9.06)       
2. AAQ-II 48.80 (10.58) 0.43b      
3. PCS 19.22 (9.21) -0.28 -0.40b     
4. Baseline unpleasantness 
5. Baseline intensity 
6. Baseline pain 
7. Baseline fear 
-1.33 (1.73) 
5.85 (2.20) 
3.39 (2.49) 
3.13 (2.65) 
0.03 
-0.01 
-0.01 
0.07 
0.27 
-0.26 
-0.17 
-0.25 
-0.24 
0.34a 
0.32a 
0.36a 
 
-0.59c 
-0.68c 
-0.68c 
 
 
0.72c 
0.64c 
 
 
 
0.71c 
a p < .05; b p < .01; c p < .001 
Note: MAAS = Mindful Attention and Awareness Scale; AAQ-II = Acceptance and Action 
Questionnaire-II; PCS = Pain Catastrophizing Scale 
 
  
	   28	  
 
 
 
 
